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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence has recognized
a compelling state interest in preserving the lives of viable
fetuses.1 When acting to protect a “viable” fetus—one “potentially
able to live outside the mother’s womb, albeit with artificial
* Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of
Georgia School of Law. I would like to thank the other participants in this
conference and the editors of the Washington and Lee Law Review for their
helpful comments on my Article. Thank you as well to Raqketa Williams for her
research assistance. I join the editors in mourning the tragic loss of Lara Gass, a
gracious and remarkable young woman who played a central role in organizing
the conference and making the participants feel welcome.
1. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (“With respect to the State’s
important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at
viability.”).
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aid”2—the state “may go so far as to proscribe abortion . . . except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”3
Allowing relatively unrestricted abortion until fetal viability
represents an extremely broad recognition of abortion rights by
international standards.4 Only a handful of countries join the
United States in permitting abortion for any reason until fetal
viability or beyond.5 As Justice Blackmun recognized in a
memorandum to Justice Powell, “[b]y that time [viability], the
state’s interest [in protecting fetal life] has grown large indeed.”6
In prior articles, I have critiqued the Court’s failure to offer a
plausible constitutional or moral justification for treating
viability as the earliest point at which a state may significantly
limit abortions.7 Viability varies from one fetus to the next based
on factors that should be legally and morally irrelevant, including
the progress and availability of neonatal treatment techniques,
the race and gender of the fetus, the mother’s altitude during
gestation, and whether the mother smokes during pregnancy.8 It
2. Id. at 160.
3. Id. at 163–64.
4. See Randy Beck, State Interests and the Duration of Abortion Rights, 44
MCGEORGE L. REV. 31, 40–41 (2013) [hereinafter Beck, State Interests] (showing
that the viability rule is extreme when compared to abortion laws of other
countries).
5. See id. (noting that most countries require a “legally permissible
reason” for seeking an abortion or only recognize the right to abort within the
first twelve weeks of pregnancy (citing Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the
Viability Rule, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 249, 264 (2009))).
6. See Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s
Trimester Framework, 51 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 505, 523 (2011) [hereinafter Beck,
Self-Conscious Dicta] (discussing private correspondence between Justices
Powell and Blackmun, in which Blackmun indicated his lack of commitment to
the point marking the end of the first trimester versus another point, such as
viability).
7. See, e.g., Randy Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, 103 NW.
U. L. REV. 249, 271–76 (2009) [hereinafter Beck, Gonzales, Casey and the
Viability Rule] (noting that the Roe Court failed to provide a constitutional
principle to support its conclusion that a state may only prohibit abortions of
viable fetuses and considering whether this omission was rectified in Casey);
Randy Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers in the Law of Precedent, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1462–63 (2012) (discussing scholars’ analysis of the
Roe Court’s lack of constitutional justification).
8. See Beck, State Interests, supra note 4, at 37–40 (explaining the various
factors physicians often consider when determining viability of a fetus, but
noting that viability is arbitrary because many of these factors are “morally and
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therefore seems difficult to explain why the state’s interest in
protecting fetal life would become significantly greater after the
fetus crosses the viability threshold than before.9 Nor does fetal
viability reduce the burden of pregnancy on the mother.10
Setting those questions to the side, however, I start this
Article from the premise that the Court was correct in Roe v.
Wade11 concerning the significance of fetal viability. I assume for
the sake of argument that viability is a momentous point in
pregnancy and that “logical and biological justifications” support
a compelling state interest in protecting the lives of fetuses that
have crossed the viability threshold.12 The goal of this Article is to
highlight factors that individually and in concert significantly
hinder legislative attempts to preserve the lives of viable fetuses,
and to identify measures that, if permitted by the courts, could
facilitate the pursuit of this state interest.
Part II of the Article argues that Supreme Court case law
virtually guarantees that some viable fetuses will be aborted even
though they could in fact survive outside the womb with proper
care. The Court has required some level of deference to debatable
viability predictions made by treating physicians, even if those
predictions may be unduly pessimistic about the prospects for
fetal survival.13 Part III notes that most abortions take place in
private facilities operated by abortion providers, making it
difficult to monitor the provider’s compliance with a state law
prohibiting postviability abortions.14 By way of illustration, I
consider the investigation and prosecution of Philadelphia’s Dr.
Kermit Gosnell, which disclosed a number of techniques Gosnell
employed to cover up the deaths of hundreds of viable fetuses and
constitutionally irrelevant”).
9. See id. at 40 (critiquing the Court’s selection of viability as the
controlling line because crossing the viability threshold does not increase a
state’s interest in protecting human life).
10. See id. (explaining that viable fetuses impose no less of a burden on the
mother than pre-viable fetuses).
11. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
12. Id. at 163.
13. See infra note 46 (explaining Roe v. Wade’s deference to medical
judgment); infra notes 59–61 and accompanying text (discussing the uncertainty
of determining fetal viability, which causes disagreement among physicians).
14. Infra Part III.
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newborn infants over an extended period.15 Part IV points out
that Dr. Gosnell’s violations of Pennsylvania law were facilitated
by the unwillingness of public officials to provide oversight and
ensure regulatory compliance, notwithstanding numerous reports
of serious problems at Gosnell’s clinic.16 Part V suggests that the
Supreme Court could facilitate state protection of viable fetuses
by allowing prohibition of elective abortions at a time shortly
before viability, such as twenty weeks gestation, a line that would
be easier to enforce than viability itself.17 Additional protection
could be afforded to viable fetuses by allowing states to require
hospitalization at some point in the second trimester, so that
abortions near the viability threshold would take place in an
environment that was both safer and less isolated from the
broader medical community.
II. The Requirement of Deference to Abortion Providers Virtually
Ensures the Abortion of Some Viable Fetuses
The Supreme Court has attributed considerable significance
to the point in pregnancy described as “viability,” treating the
fetus potentially able to live outside the womb as categorically
distinct from the same fetus a few weeks or a few days before
viability.18 At the same time, the importance of viability in the
Supreme Court’s case law has diminished over the years.19 Dicta
in Roe—part of the opinion’s “trimester framework”—identified
viability as the earliest point at which a state’s interest in fetal
life becomes “compelling,” justifying a prohibition on abortion.20
15. See infra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing the prosecution of
Dr. Kermit Gosnell).
16. Infra Part IV.
17. Infra Part V.
18. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) (concluding that the
“compelling point” for a state’s interest in protecting potential life is at
viability).
19. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878–79
(1992) (rejecting Roe’s “trimester framework” and stressing the state’s “profound
interest in protecting potential life”).
20. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64 (“With respect to the State’s important and
legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at viability . . . .
[The State] may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.”); Beck, Self-
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In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,21
the controlling plurality opinion rejected Roe’s trimester
framework and concluded that states could legislate to protect
fetal life from the outset of pregnancy, so long as the regulation
did not place an “undue burden” on abortion rights.22 However,
the Casey plurality, again in dicta, deferred to Roe’s conclusion
that abortion may only be proscribed after fetal viability.23 More
recently, in Gonzales v. Carhart,24 the Court upheld a ban on the
intact dilation and evacuation abortion technique, even prior to
viability,25 notwithstanding the dissent’s claim that the majority
had “blur[red] the line, firmly drawn in Casey, between
previability and postviability abortions.”26
Forty years after Roe, the Court’s rationale for selecting
viability as a controlling line in pregnancy remains obscure.27 In
neither Roe nor Casey did the Court offer a plausible moral or
constitutional reason for concluding that the state interest in
fetal life justifies substantial limits on abortion only after the
fetus might be able to survive outside the womb.28 But
notwithstanding the absence of legal or philosophical
justification, one might think that the viability rule at least has
the virtue of clarity.29 The Casey plurality highlighted this
Conscious Dicta, supra note 6, at 516 (noting that evidence from case files shows
Justices in the Roe majority knew they were creating dicta in drawing a line at
viability).
21. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
22. See id. at 878–79 (recognizing the central right of Roe but rejecting its
“trimester framework,” thereby allowing states to impose regulations on
abortion services that satisfy an “undue burden” analysis).
23. See id. at 879 (reaffirming the conclusion of Roe that states may
regulate and prohibit abortion after viability).
24. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
25. See id. at 147 (concluding that the Act prohibiting the dilation and
evacuation abortion techniques is not void for vagueness, does not impose an
undue burden, and is not invalid on its face).
26. Id. at 171 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
27. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 279
(“In the post-Gonzales world, the task of establishing the legitimacy of the
viability rule has become significantly more demanding.”).
28. See id. at 267–76 (discussing the Supreme Court’s failure to justify the
viability rule).
29. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 869–70
(1992) (arguing right to abortion should be governed by “a line that is clear” and
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rationale in explaining its decision to adhere to viability as a
controlling line in pregnancy: “Liberty must not be extinguished
for want of a line that is clear.”30
In the abstract arena of legal discourse, viability seems to
offer a clear conceptual line that distinguishes two classes of
fetuses: those that can survive outside the womb and are subject
to legal protection, and those that cannot survive outside the
womb and may not be effectively protected by the state.31
Regrettably, though, the seeming clarity of the viability rule
evaporates when one understands how viability determinations
are made in medical practice. The viability of a fetus is not an
objective description of a readily observable set of
characteristics.32 It is instead a medical prognosis, a prediction
about what would happen if you removed the fetus from the
nurturing environment of the womb and instead employed
whatever neonatal treatment techniques were at hand.33 In
Colautti v. Franklin,34 the Supreme Court emphasized “the
uncertainty of the viability determination”35:
As the record in this case indicates, a physician determines
whether or not a fetus is viable after considering a number of
variables: the gestational age of the fetus, derived from the
reported menstrual history of the woman; fetal weight, based
on an inexact estimate of the size and condition of the uterus;
the woman’s general health and nutrition; the quality of the
available medical facilities; and other factors. Because of the
number and the imprecision of these variables, the probability
of any particular fetus’ obtaining meaningful life outside the
womb can be determined only with difficulty. Moreover, the
record indicates that even if agreement may be reached on the
then drawing the line at viability).
30. Id. at 869.
31. See id. (explaining the Court’s insistence on “drawing the line” at
viability).
32. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 257
(explaining that doctors determining viability must predict the likely
consequences of premature delivery, often with the assistance of medical
research on the survival rates of premature infants).
33. Id.
34. 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
35. See id. at 395–96 (concluding that the “uncertainty of the viability
determination” makes it problematic to impose strict civil or criminal liability
against physicians performing abortions near the viability threshold).
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probability of survival, different physicians equate viability
with different probabilities of survival, and some physicians
refuse to equate viability with any numerical probability at all.
In the face of these uncertainties, it is not unlikely that
experts will disagree over whether a particular fetus in the
second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability.36

Once it is recognized that viability represents an uncertain
medical prediction, it is understandable that doctors might
disagree about which fetuses have arrived at that stage of
development.37 In some circumstances, all competent doctors
should reach the same conclusion about the viability or
nonviability of a particular fetus.38 In cases nearer to the margin,
however, two doctors might reasonably disagree about viability,
just as they might disagree about the likely consequences of a
particular medical treatment or the length of time a particular
patient has to live.39
Given that viability determinations are uncertain and
debatable, it follows that some of them will almost certainly be
wrong.40 On the one hand, a physician might reach a mistaken
conclusion that a fetus can survive outside the womb. If a doctor
performs a Caesarian section to deliver what he believes to be a
viable fetus, the infant might nevertheless fail to survive,
notwithstanding the best efforts of a neonatal intensive care unit.
Conversely, a doctor might mistakenly declare nonviable a fetus
that could, in reality, survive with proper care. Errors in this
direction are less likely to be detected if the viable fetus perishes
in the course of an abortion.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 396 (“[D]ifferent physicians equate viability with different
probabilities of survival . . . .”); Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule,
supra note 7, at 271 (noting that viability causes disagreement among medical
professionals because it involves predictions made on a case-by-case basis using
various factors that change over time (citations omitted)).
38. But see Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395–96 (explaining the uncertainty of
determining viability, which may lead experts to disagree over whether a
particular fetus is viable).
39. See id. (“[I]t is not unlikely that experts will disagree over whether a
particular fetus in the second trimester has advanced to the stage of viability.”).
40. See Beck, State Interests, supra note 4, at 37 (noting that different
doctors might classify the same fetus as viable or nonviable, due to differences
in skill and treatment philosophy) (citing Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the
Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 260).
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The Supreme Court’s abortion jurisprudence seems to clearly
support two propositions: (1) by the time a fetus can potentially
survive outside the womb, the state has a compelling interest in
protecting the life of that fetus;41 and (2) a doctor may mistakenly
classify a viable fetus as nonviable.42 From those two
propositions, it would seem to follow that the state needs a
regulatory means to protect viable fetuses against the effects of
such medical errors.43 After all, compelling state interests are
interests of the highest magnitude.44 They are so important that
they justify qualification of constitutional rights.45 If the Roe
Court was correct about the significance of fetal viability, the
state should seemingly have some means by which it can
vindicate its compelling interest in protecting a viable fetus at
risk of death due to a mistaken medical conclusion that it is not
viable.
Contrary to these expectations, the Supreme Court’s case law
has instead stressed deference to a doctor’s potentially mistaken
viability determinations, making it difficult for states to protect
viable fetuses in cases near the margin. As commentators have
noted, Roe and its early progeny seem to focus on the interests of
doctors as much as their patients,46 perhaps a result of Justice
41. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 837
(1992) (reaffirming Roe’s conclusion that after viability, a state’s interest in
protecting potential human life allows it to regulate and proscribe abortion,
except where it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother (citing
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973))); Roe, 410 U.S. at 163–64 (concluding
that the state’s interest in protecting potential life becomes “compelling” at
viability).
42. See, e.g., Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979) (explaining
the various and uncertain factors used to predict viability, which may lead to
disagreement among professionals).
43. See infra Part V (discussing the author’s proposed regulations).
44. Cf. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (noting that “only
those interests of the highest order” could justify restrictions on free exercise of
religion).
45. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., 462 U.S. 416, 428
(1983) (“At viability this interest in protecting the potential life of the unborn
child is so important that the State may proscribe abortions altogether, ‘except
when it is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.’” (quoting Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973)), overruled on other grounds by Casey, 505
U.S. 833).
46. See, e.g., Yvonne Lindgren, The Rhetoric of Choice: Restoring
Healthcare to the Abortion Right, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 385, 393 (2013) (“In Roe v.

OVERCOMING BARRIERS

1271

Blackmun’s years representing the Mayo Clinic before he became
a judge.47 The Roe opinion sometimes framed its discussion in
terms of doctors’ rights: in the first trimester, for instance, the
Court said “the attending physician, in consultation with his
patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State,
that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s pregnancy should be
terminated.”48 This physician-centered view of abortion remains
apparent in later opinions dealing with state regulations relating
to fetal viability.49 In Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth,50 for instance, the Court noted that in Roe, “[t]he
participation by the attending physician in the abortion decision,
and his responsibility in that decision . . . were emphasized.”51 In
keeping with this emphasis on empowering medical practitioners,
Danforth described viability as “a point purposefully left flexible
for professional determination, and dependent upon developing

Wade the Court framed the right of abortion as the right of doctors to practice
medicine according to their professional judgment rather than recognizing
abortion as a right of women’s health that necessarily included access to
abortion services.” (citations omitted)). The Court’s insistence on deference to
the judgments of the treating physician traces back to Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973), the companion case to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Doe, the
Court struck down a Georgia provision for review by a hospital review
committee of the treating physician’s abortion recommendation, which it viewed
as “basically redundant.” Id. at 195–98. It also rejected a separate requirement
that two physicians examine the woman and concur in the treating physician’s
recommendation of an abortion: “Required acquiescence by co-practitioners has
no rational connection with a patient’s needs and unduly infringes on the
physician’s right to practice.” Id. at 198–99.
47. See Nan D. Hunter, Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the Myth of
Medical Independence, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 147, 147 (2006)
The most common explanation of how this modest man came to
produce such an immodest decision [Roe] draws on Blackmun’s
background as resident counsel for the Mayo Clinic and his
admiration of the medical profession. Justice Blackmun had wanted
to become a doctor; later in life he became a lawyer for doctors, and
he brought to the Court a deep attitude of protectiveness toward
physicians.
48. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
49. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61
(1976) (relying on Roe to explain the role of the medical professional in
determining viability).
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
51. Id. at 61.
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medical skill and technical ability.”52 The Court upheld the
definition of “viability” in a Missouri statute only because it left
determination of viability to the judgment of the treating
physician:
[W]e agree with the District Court that it is not the proper
function of the legislature or the courts to place viability,
which essentially is a medical concept, at a specific point in the
gestation period. The time when viability is achieved may vary
with each pregnancy, and the determination of whether a
particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the
judgment of the responsible attending physician. The
[Missouri] definition of viability . . . merely reflects this fact.53

Danforth therefore rejected the contention that “a specified
number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by statute as the
point of viability.”54
The Court revisited viability determinations a few terms
later in Colautti, again emphasizing the primacy of the judgment
of the doctor performing the abortion:
Viability is reached when, in the judgment of the attending
physician on the particular facts of the case before him, there
is a reasonable likelihood of the fetus’ sustained survival
outside the womb, with or without artificial support. Because
this point may differ with each pregnancy, neither the
legislature nor the courts may proclaim one of the elements
entering into the ascertainment of viability—be it weeks of
gestation or fetal weight or any other single factor—as the
determinant of when the State has a compelling interest in the
life or health of the fetus. Viability is the critical point. And we
have recognized no attempt to stretch the point of viability one
way or the other.55

52. See id. (“Finally, for the stage subsequent to viability, a point
purposefully left flexible for professional determination, and dependent upon
developing medical skill and technical ability, the State may regulate an
abortion to protect the life of the fetus and even may proscribe abortion except
where it is necessary . . . .”).
53. Id. at 64. The Missouri statute defined “viability” as “that stage of fetal
development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely
outside the womb by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.” Id. at 63.
54. See id. at 65 (“We thus do not accept appellants' contention that a
specified number of weeks in pregnancy must be fixed by statute as the point of
viability.”).
55. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 388–89 (1979).
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The Colautti Court deemed a Pennsylvania statute
unconstitutionally vague where it imposed duties on a doctor who
determined that a fetus “is viable or if there is sufficient reason to
believe that the fetus may be viable.”56 One concern was whether
the “sufficient reason” language referred to a purely subjective
evaluation by the attending physician, or whether it
contemplated an objective second-guessing of the physician’s
determination:
[I]t is ambiguous whether there must be “sufficient reason”
from the perspective of the judgment, skill, and training of the
attending physician, or “sufficient reason” from the perspective
of a cross section of the medical community or a panel of
experts. The latter, obviously, portends not an inconsequential
hazard for the typical private practitioner who may not have
the skills and technology that are readily available at a
teaching hospital or large medical center.57

A second ambiguity flowed from the statutory identification of
two separate points in gestation—when the fetus “is viable” and
when it “may be viable”—either of which would impose
heightened duties on the doctor.58 The Court reinforced its
vagueness analysis by pointing to the absence of a scienter
requirement with respect to the treating physician’s
determination of fetal viability:
The prospect of . . . disagreement [among doctors about
viability], in conjunction with a statute imposing strict civil
and criminal liability for an erroneous determination of
viability, could have a profound chilling effect on the
willingness of physicians to perform abortions near the point
of viability in the manner indicated by their best medical
judgment.59

The precise implications of Danforth and Colautti are open to
debate. The Court did not accord complete deference to the doctor
56. See id. at 380 n.1. (reciting relevant portions of the Pennsylvania
statute).
57. Id. at 391–92.
58. See id. at 393 (explaining that “may be viable” could mean there is a
remote possibility that the fetus can survive outside the womb, yet it has not
attained the reasonable likelihood of survival usually associated with viability,
or it could refer to viability “as physicians understand it”).
59. Id. at 396.
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performing the abortion in either case.60 Roe itself indicated that,
as in other medical contexts, the doctor’s medical judgments with
respect to abortion are subject to oversight by the state:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to
administer medical treatment according to his professional
judgment up to the points where important state interests
provide compelling justifications for intervention. Up to those
points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently,
and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for
it must rest with the physician. If an individual practitioner
abuses the privilege of exercising proper medical judgment,
the usual remedies, judicial and intra-professional, are
available.61

Colautti referred to this portion of Roe, suggesting that an abuse
of proper medical judgment in the context of a viability
determination would be subject to “judicial and intraprofessional” remedies.62
At the same time, Danforth and Colautti do seem to give
primacy to physicians’ viability determinations when they cannot
be viewed as abuses of medical judgment, even if other doctors
would reach contrary conclusions.63 It is ironic that Colautti
accepts as a given that abortion practitioners “may not have the
skills and technology” of a teaching hospital or large medical
center, and then makes the medical judgments of such
practitioners the standard for determining the legal rights of
potentially viable fetuses.64 The irony grows more troubling when
60. See id. at 387 (noting the availability of judicial and professional
remedies if the doctor abused the privilege of making medical judgments);
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64–65 (1976) (noting
that the determination of fetal viability is to be made using the exercise of
“professional judgment”).
61. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165–66 (1973).
62. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979) (explaining the
Court’s past emphasis on affording the physician the discretion to determine
viability (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 166)).
63. See id. at 387–88 (explaining the Court’s deference to medical judgment
in Roe, Doe, and Danforth and reaffirming the principle (citations omitted));
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 64 (recognizing that “viability was a matter of medical
judgment, skill, and technical ability”).
64. Compare Colautti, 439 U.S. at 391–92 (explaining that the statute at
issue is unclear as to whether there must be sufficient reason to believe a fetus
is viable from the perspective of the medical community or the attending
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one recognizes that the doctors making these decisions about the
legal status of another human being may operate under a conflict
of interest.65 Doctors willing to perform late-term abortions can
earn significant fees.66 Most abortion providers will not perform
abortions after twenty weeks because of the increased risk of
complications.67 Consequently, providers willing to perform
abortions near the margin of viability, or after viability, may be
able to charge higher rates.68 The potential revenue from nearphysician, who may be a private practitioner without the skills and technology
of larger facilities), with id. at 396 (“We reaffirm, however, that ‘the
determination of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter
for the judgment of the responsible attending physician.’” (quoting Danforth,
428 U.S. at 64)).
65. Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton) (“No man ought
certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to which he
has the least interest or bias.”).
66. See ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER IN THE UNITED STATES 2
(2013), http://www.plannedparenthood.org/files/PPFA/Abortion_After_First_Tri
mester.pdf [hereinafter ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER] (“[I]n 2009, nonhospital facilities charged an average of $1500 for abortion at 20 weeks.”
(citations omitted)).
67. REPORT OF THE GRAND JURY at 3, In re County Investigating Grand Jury
XXIII (2011) (Misc. No. 0009901-2008) [hereinafter GRAND JURY REPORT] (“Most
doctors won’t perform late second-trimester abortions, from approximately the
20th week of pregnancy, because of the risks involved.”); id. at 27 (reporting
that Dr. Gosnell “had many late-term Philadelphia patients because most other
local clinics would not perform procedures past 20 weeks”); Rachel K. Jones,
Mia R. S. Zolna, Stanley K. Henshaw & Lawrence B. Finer, Abortion in the
United States: Incidence and Access to Services, 2005, 40 PERSP. ON SEXUAL &
REPROD. HEALTH 6, 14 (2008) (noting that only 20% of abortion providers offered
services at twenty weeks and only eight percent offered services at twenty-four
CTR.
FOR
REPROD.
HEALTH,
weeks);
Abortion
Care,
UNM
http://www.unmcrh.org/abortion-care/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2013) (“We offer
abortion care up to 22 weeks gestational age (time since last menstrual
period).”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). One study of
abortion mortality found 3.4 deaths per 100,000 abortions performed between
sixteen and twenty weeks, compared to 8.9 deaths per 100,000 for abortions
performed at twenty-one weeks or above. Linda A. Bartlett et al., Risk Factors
for Legal Induced Abortion-Related Mortality in the United States, 103
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 729, 733 (2004).
68. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at app. C (2005 price list
showing price of $1625 for abortion performed at or between twenty-three and
twenty-four weeks). For some particularly late abortions, Dr. Kermit Gosnell of
Philadelphia reportedly charged $2500–$3000. See id. at 81 (noting a sliding
scale of charges “with late-term abortions sometimes costing $2,500 or more”);
id. at 88 (noting testimony from employees and patients who said Gosnell
charged anywhere from $2,500–$3,000 for late-term abortions).
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viability abortions may provide a powerful incentive for finding a
marginal fetus nonviable so the abortion may be performed.69
Other nonmedical factors, such as a strong commitment to
women’s reproductive autonomy, might also incline a doctor to
declare a fetus nonviable in situations open to debate.70
Colautti seemed to accept as normal the idea that different
physicians might agree on the probability of fetal survival and yet
reach different conclusions as to fetal viability.71 This goes a long
way toward putting doctors’ viability determinations on the honor
system, rather than treating viability as a serious regulatory line
with weighty state interests at stake. The Court’s requirement of
deference to the treating physician would seem to shield a doctor
who performs an abortion on a fetus declared “nonviable” even if
other doctors with different financial and professional incentives
would reach the opposite conclusion.72 This requirement of
deference to the attending physician’s viability determinations
virtually guarantees that some fetuses will be aborted in cases
near the margin even though they could in fact survive outside
the womb with proper care.73 In such situations, the Court’s case
law requiring deference to a doctor desiring to perform an
abortion undermines the state’s acknowledged and compelling
interest in protecting viable unborn human life.74
69. See Jones, supra note 67, at 14 (noting that the average cost of an
abortion at ten weeks is $523 but the average cost at twenty weeks is three
times this amount).
70. Cf. Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990)
(recognizing that a doctor’s medical judgment may be influenced by personal
interests).
71. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979) (explaining that
physicians may agree on a fetus’ probability of survival, but their opinions may
differ on whether to associate viability with that level of survival).
72. See Beck, Gonzales, Casey, and the Viability Rule, supra note 7, at 260
(explaining that deference to medical judgments may prove problematic where
the doctor has financial, legal, or ideological interests at stake (citing Moore, 793
P.2d at 485)).
73. See Beck, State’s Interest, supra note 4, at 57 (“The imprecision of the
viability line will make it very difficult in some cases to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that a particular doctor knew he or she was aborting a viable
fetus.”).
74. See id. (noting that the viability rule defers to the judgment of the
physician to such a degree that it “undermines the goal of regulating the
physician’s conduct”).
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III. Providers Sometimes Conceal Performance of Postviability
Abortions
A second barrier to state protection of viable fetuses results
from the fact that abortions typically take place in private clinics
and doctors’ offices operated by a small number of personnel.75 In
Doe v. Bolton,76 the Supreme Court struck down a requirement
that all abortions be performed in an accredited hospital.77 In
City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,78 the
Court invalidated an ordinance requiring hospitalization for any
abortion in the second trimester.79 These decisions have fostered
the proliferation of medical facilities dedicated to performance of
abortions as their primary activity.80 The Guttmacher Institute
reports that “[n]early all U.S. abortions take place in nonhospital
settings.”81
According to Guttmacher Institute researchers, as of 2005,
only twenty percent of abortion clinics performed abortions at
twenty weeks gestation, and only eight percent reported that they
did so at twenty-four weeks.82 If these figures remain accurate,
many abortion clinics would not seem to present a high risk of

75. Cf. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 435
(1983) (noting that second-trimester abortions rarely took place in hospitals),
overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); see also Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, TRAP Laws Gain
Political Traction While Abortion Clinics—And the Women They Serve—Pay the
Price, 16 GUTTMACHER POLICY REV. 7, 7 (2013) (noting that nearly all abortions
in the United States take place in non-hospital settings) (citation omitted).
76. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
77. See id. at 194–95 (concluding that the provision in question requiring
hospitalization for second trimester abortions was invalid because the state
failed to prove that only hospitals could satisfy the state’s health interest).
78. 462 U.S. 416 (1983), overruled on other grounds by Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
79. See id. at 434–39 (arguing an Akron ordinance imposed a burden on
access to abortion procedures because requiring hospitalization may result in
additional and unnecessary expenses).
80. David M. Smolin, Cultural and Technological Obstacles to the
Mainstreaming of Abortion, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 261, 261 (1993) (“Most
abortions are performed in specialized abortion clinics, rather than in hospitals
or physicians’ offices.”).
81. Gold & Nash, supra note 75, at 7.
82. Jones et al., supra note 67, at 14.
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performing postviability abortions.83 Because most abortions do
not occur in hospital settings, however, when a clinic does
perform abortions near the viability threshold, much of the
information relevant to the viability determination—fetal weight,
mother’s health, race and gender of the fetus, ultrasound images,
last reported menstrual period and the like—will be in the
possession of the doctor and his staff.84 A doctor willing to violate
a state law prohibiting abortion after viability would presumably
screen employees to ensure loyalty.85 While most states ask
doctors to submit information about each abortion, including the
gestational age of the fetus (California being a notable
exception),86 one would not expect a doctor desiring to perform
postviability abortions to accurately comply with such reporting
rules.87
The prosecution of Philadelphia’s Dr. Kermit Gosnell
highlights steps taken by one profit-motivated abortion provider
to conceal the performance of postviability abortions.88 Gosnell
was convicted in 2013 on hundreds of charges, including three
counts of first-degree murder for killing infants born alive at his
83. But see infra notes 165–66 and accompanying text (noting that Gosnell
falsified records and failed to report numerous late-term abortions).
84. See, e.g., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 247 (noting the
difficulty in obtaining evidence for criminal prosecution because the illegal
activity took place inside Gosnell’s clinic).
85. But see Wendy Saltzman, Delaware Abortion Clinic Facing Charges of
Unsafe and Unsanitary Conditions, ABC ACTION NEWS, WPVI-TV (July 24,
2013), http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?id=9059172 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014)
(reporting recent cases of abortion clinic staff disclosing violations of the law by
their employers) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: ABORTION REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
(2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ARR.pdf (charting the
forty-seven states requiring reporting).
87. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 156 (detailing inaccuracies
in reports filed by Gosnell).
88. Joseph A. Slobodzian, Gosnell Guilty of Three Murder Counts, PHILA.
INQUIRER (May 15, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-05-15/news/ 39258185_
1_verdict-jury-gosnell-case (last visited Jan. 10, 2014) (reporting the outcome of
Dr. Kermit Gosnell’s murder trial) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Sarah Hoye & Sunny Hostin, Doctor Found Guilty of First-Degree
Murder in Philadelphia Abortion Case, CNN (May 14, 2013) http://www.cnn.
com/2013/05/13/justice/pennsylvania-abortion-doctor-trial/ (last visited Jan. 10,
2014) (reporting Dr. Kermit Gosnell’s murder convictions) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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clinic, involuntary manslaughter in the death of an adult patient,
and twenty-one counts of performing abortions on women more
than twenty-four weeks pregnant.89 The grand jury that
investigated Gosnell’s clinic produced a lengthy report,
suggesting that the counts recommended for prosecution
represented just the tip of the iceberg.90 According to the grand
jury, Gosnell attracted business from surrounding states because
he “was known as a doctor who would perform abortions at any
stage, without regard for legal limits.”91 The grand jury estimated
that Gosnell performed at least four or five illegal abortions a
week.92 In addition to performing abortions on viable fetuses in
utero,93 Gosnell’s clinic often induced delivery of live babies at the
clinic, at which point Gosnell or another staff member would
“[e]nsur[e] fetal demise” by “sticking scissors into the back of the
baby’s neck and cutting the spinal cord. He called that
‘snipping.’”94 The grand jury reported that “[o]ver the years, there
were hundreds of ‘snippings,’” but “[m]ost of these acts cannot be

89. Slobodzian, supra note 88; Hoye & Hostin, supra note 88.
90. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 219–47 (suggesting various
criminal charges against Dr. Kermit Gosnell).
91. Id. at 27.
92. Id. at 79.
93. See id. (“Steven Massof estimated that in 40 percent of the secondtrimester abortions performed by Gosnell, the fetuses were beyond 24 weeks
gestational age. Latosha Lewis testified that Gosnell performed procedures over
24 weeks ‘too much to count,’ and ones up to 26 weeks ‘very often.’”); id. at 78
Several of the clinic’s former staff told the Grand Jury that Gosnell
performed many, many abortions beyond the legal limit in
Pennsylvania—a gestational age of 24 weeks. Their testimony is
confirmed by clinic files, by fetal remains found at the facility, by
photographs of babies that Gosnell delivered and then killed, and by
a 30-plus-weeks baby girl born dead at a hospital after Gosnell had
inserted laminaria to begin a third trimester abortion.
94. Id. at 4; see also id. at 99–100 (“Gosnell’s staff testified about scores of
gruesome killings of such born-alive infants carried out mainly by Gosnell, but
also by employees Steve Massof, Lynda Williams, and Adrienne Moton. These
killings became so routine that no one could put an exact number on them. They
were considered ‘standard procedure.’”). One of Gosnell’s employees indicated
that the doctor preferred it when the baby was delivered because it involved less
work for him and reduced the risk that he would perforate the uterus,
something that had resulted in a number of malpractice suits. Id. at 31.
Therefore, he would sometimes have his staff press on patients’ abdomens to
bring about delivery. Id.
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prosecuted, because Gosnell destroyed the files.”95 “It was
Gosnell’s standard business practice,” they concluded, “to slay
viable babies.”96
The grand jury’s report noted a variety of steps Dr. Gosnell
took that helped hide his performance of illegal postviability
abortions:
•

•

Gosnell regularly falsified reports submitted to the state
Department of Health to vastly underreport the number of
second- and third-trimester abortions he performed.97 His
final quarterly report indicated that he had performed 118
first-trimester abortions and two second-trimester
abortions. However, in reviewing just a few files, state
officials found evidence of at least six second-trimester
abortions performed in the last two months of the
quarter.98
The reports Gosnell filed between 2000 and 2010
apparently indicated that there were no complications
from abortions performed at his clinic,99 even though two

95. Id. at 5; see also id. at 114 (noting that an unlicensed doctor at the
clinic, Steven Massof, “admitted that there were about 100 instances in which
he severed the spinal cord after seeing a breath or some sign of life”).
96. See id. at 25 (“It was Gosnell’s standard business practice, to slay viable
babies. The women who died, or whose health he recklessly endangered or
irreparably harmed, were simply collateral damage for the doctor’s corrupt and
criminal enterprise.”).
97. See id. at 156 (detailing failure by Dr. Gosnell to file accurate reports
required by the Department of Health).
98. Id. Testimony heard by the grand jury indicated that as of 2000,
Gosnell was performing between five and six second-trimester abortions each
week, but that as referrals of first-trimester abortions diminished, Gosnell came
to rely more on referrals for late-term abortions. See id. at 26–28 (relating
testimony about how Dr. Gosnell ran his clinic and how it changed over time to
allow for more late-term abortions).
99. See id. at 171 (noting that the forms the Department of Health relied
on to compile data for its reports were falsified by Gosnell and therefore
“worthless”). It is not clear how to reconcile the grand jury’s statement on page
171 that the forms filed by Gosnell between 2000 and 2010 recorded only one
second-trimester abortion with the statement on page 156 that the report for the
last quarter of 2009 recorded two second-trimester abortions; however, both
references are consistent in that they show Gosnell vastly underreporting the
number of second-trimester abortions he performed. Compare id. at 156 (“The
most recent report filed by Gosnell’s clinic stated that it had performed 118 firsttrimester and 2 second-trimester abortions in the fourth quarter of 2009.”), with
id. at 171 (“The forms that Gosnell filed between 2000 and 2010—the ones DOH
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patients died from abortion complications during that time
period and several others sued Gosnell for malpractice.100
When an ultrasound showed that a fetus was beyond
twenty-four weeks gestation, Dr. Gosnell trained his staff
to “fudge the measurement process” by “aim[ing] the
ultrasound probe at an angle to make the fetus look
smaller.”101
When a fetus was beyond twenty-four weeks gestation,
Gosnell would record in the file that the gestational age
was 24.5 weeks, regardless of the actual gestational age.102
Much of the time Gosnell performed illegal abortions in
front of his staff.103 But there were some, abortions of “the
really big ones,” that even he was afraid to perform in
front of others. These abortions were scheduled for
Sundays, a day when the clinic was closed and none of the
regular employees were present. Only one person was
allowed to assist with these special cases—Gosnell’s
wife.104
According to clinic staff, Gosnell took patient files home
and did not keep files for most of his late-term abortions at
the clinic.105 Only some of these files were recovered and
one was found in his car, partially shredded.106

then relied on to compile its reports to the Legislature—recorded only one
second-trimester abortion and no complications.”).
100. See infra notes 131 and 140 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the two women who died from complications after receiving abortions at
Gosnell’s clinic.
101. GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 75; see also id. at 79–81
(including testimony from former employees of Dr. Gosnell who were trained to
manipulate ultrasound images so that fetuses appeared smaller).
102. See id. at 4 (explaining that for almost every second ultrasound
performed, a gestational age of 24.5 weeks was recorded even though “most of
these pregnancies were considerably more advanced”).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 5–6; see also id. at 81 (“Lewis and Massof both testified that they
believed Gosnell dealt with some of the patients with the longest-term
pregnancies on Sundays, when his staff was not at the clinic.”).
105. See id. at 83 (recounting testimony of two clinic employees who stated
that Dr. Gosnell destroyed patient files or took them home if he did not believe
the files should be in the clinic due to the advanced stage of the pregnancy).
106. See id. (noting that some patient files were found in a search of Dr.
Gosnell’s home and car, and of these files, one was partially shredded). The
grand jury believed that falsification, removal and destruction of files prevented

1282

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1263 (2014)

•

Doctors in Pennsylvania are supposed to send tissue from
late term abortions to a pathologist to examine for
evidence that the fetus was viable or born alive.107 Gosnell
did not comply with this requirement.108

While the grand jury had voluminous evidence of the general
course of practice at Gosnell’s clinic, they found it difficult to
pursue charges in many of the particular cases because it was
difficult to secure evidence clear enough for criminal prosecution:
“Gosnell, we are convinced, committed hundreds of acts of
infanticide. He got away with them for decades because they all
took place inside his clinic.”109
IV. Regulators in Some States Are Unwilling to Closely Supervise
Abortion Providers
The Gosnell case shows how one abortion provider, over the
course of many years, avoided detection as he and his employees
ended the lives of hundreds of viable fetuses and newly delivered
infants. One possible solution to such problems would be close
oversight by state officials responsible for regulating abortion
clinics. The Gosnell case, however, highlights a third barrier to
state protection of viable fetuses. As documented by the Gosnell
grand jury, officials responsible for protecting public health in
Pennsylvania proved unwilling to enforce applicable laws
regulating abortion, in part for political or ideological reasons.110
prosecution in a large number of cases where charges would have been
appropriate. See id. at 115
We believe, given the manner in which Gosnell operated, that he
killed the vast majority of babies that he aborted after 24 weeks . . . .
Because files were falsified or removed from the facility and possibly
destroyed, we cannot substantiate all of the individual cases in which
charges might otherwise have resulted.
107. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3214(c) (West 2103) (“When there is an
abortion performed after the first trimester of pregnancy where the physician
has certified the unborn child is not viable, the dead unborn child and all tissue
removed at the time of the abortion shall be submitted for tissue analysis to
a . . . pathologist.”).
108. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 75 (noting Gosnell’s various
violations of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act).
109. Id. at 247.
110. See id. at 137–215 (detailing lack of investigation of Gosnell’s practices
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As a consequence, abortion providers in Pennsylvania operated
without significant oversight.111
The agency with the principal statutory authority to regulate
abortion clinics in Pennsylvania is the state Department of
Health.112 The grand jury concluded that “[t]he Department of
Health conducted sporadic, inadequate inspections [of Gosnell’s
clinic] for 13 years, and then none at all between 1993 and
2010.”113 The clinic was inspected when it opened in 1979, with
later reviews in 1986 (for which no documentation was located),
1989, 1992, and 1993.114 The 1989 inspection report noted a
number of violations of applicable regulations, including “no
board-certified doctor on staff or contracted as a consultant; no
nurses overseeing the recovery of patients; no transfer agreement
with a hospital for emergency care; and no lab work recorded in
several files.”115 When the clinic was next inspected in 1992,
Gosnell still did not employ any nurses.116 Nevertheless, the
inspectors reported “no deficiencies,” leaving blank the portions of
the form dealing with anesthesia and postoperative care—where
the inadequate staffing should have been noted.117 Gosnell still
had not hired any nurses by the time of the 1993 inspection, and
there were other deficiencies noted at that time, such as lab work
missing from patient files.118 A few months later, however, a
by various state departments and officials).
111. Id.
112. See id. at 137 (noting that the state Department of Health holds the
responsibility of “writing and enforcing regulations to protect health and safety
in abortion clinics” and other health care facilities).
113. Id. at 138.
114. Id. at 138–43. Gosnell was initially a staff physician at the clinic, but by
1989, he was the only doctor practicing there. Compare id. at 139 (“The [1979]
DOH ‘site review’ at the time identified a certified obstetrician/gynecologist,
Joni Magee, as the medical director, with Gosnell listed as a staff physician.”),
with id. at 140 (“By 1989, Gosnell, who is not board-certified as either an
obstetrician or a gynecologist, was the only doctor at the facility.”).
115. Id. at 140.
116. See id. (noting that the 1992 DOH inspection found that there were still
no nurses employed by the clinic for the purpose of monitoring patient recovery).
117. See id. at 140–41 (describing a meeting in 1999 at which high-level
government officials rejected the recommendation to reinstitute regular
inspections of abortion clinics).
118. See id. at 141–42 (describing the 1992 Department of Health inspection
of Dr. Gosnell’s clinic).

1284

71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1263 (2014)

Department of Health employee, without a follow up inspection,
recorded that the deficiencies had been corrected.119
Even these half-hearted and ineffective inspections came to a
halt after 1993, as reported by the grand jury:
[T]he Pennsylvania Department of Health abruptly decided,
for political reasons, to stop inspecting abortion clinics at all.
The politics in question were not anti-abortion, but pro. With
the change of administration from Governor Casey to
Governor Ridge, officials concluded that inspections would be
“putting a barrier up to women” seeking abortions.120

There was a discussion of reinstituting inspections in 1999,
but the decision was made not to do so.121 According to an
attorney who participated in that meeting:
[T]here was a concern that if they did routine inspections, that
they may find a lot of these facilities didn’t meet [the
standards for getting patients out by stretcher or wheelchair
in an emergency], and then there would be less abortion
facilities, less access to women to have an abortion.122

After 1993, the Department of Health’s official policy was
that abortion clinics would only be inspected in response to
complaints.123 Over the years, the Department received multiple
complaints about Gosnell’s clinic:
119. See id. at 142 (noting that it was reported that the deficiencies found in
the 1993 inspection had been corrected without follow-up and Dr. Gosnell was
sent another Certificate of Approval from the Department of Health).
120. Id. at 9. But see id. at 147 (noting that regular inspection of abortion
clinics was reinstated in February of 2010, “finding authority in the same
statute they used earlier to justify not inspecting”).
121. See id. (describing a meeting at which high-level government officials
rejected the option of reinstituting regular inspections of abortion clinics).
122. Id. at 147. Sadly, Gosnell’s failure to comply with the requirements
concerning emergency evacuation of patients contributed to the death of patient
Karnamaya Mongar. See id. at 77
Another violation of Pennsylvania law proved significant the night
Karnamaya Mongar died: Clinics must have doors, elevators, and
other passages adequate to allow stretcher-borne patients to be
carried to a street-level exit. Gosnell’s clinic, with its narrow, twisted
passageways, could not accommodate a stretcher at all. And his
emergency street-level access was bolted with no accessible key. Any
chance Mongar had of being revived was hampered by the time
wasted looking for keys to the door.
123. See id. at 143 (noting that after 1993 the Department of Health’s policy
was to inspect abortion clinics only if a complaint were filed, yet the department
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In 1996, an attorney informed the Department of Health
that his client had suffered a perforated uterus, requiring
a hysterectomy, as a result of Gosnell’s negligence.124
In 1996 or 1997, a pediatrician hand-delivered a complaint
to the Department of Health after multiple teenage
patients referred to Gosnell for abortions were “infected
with trichomoniasis, a sexually transmitted parasite.”125
The doctor sent a social worker to visit Gosnell’s clinic and
then stopped referring patients there. The Department of
Health did not keep a record of the complaint.126
In January 2002, an attorney contacted the Department of
Health on behalf of the family of a twenty-two-year-old
woman who died following an abortion by Gosnell. The
department informed the attorney that no site inspections
had been performed at Gosnell’s clinic because no
complaints had been received (information that was
inaccurate).127
In February 2002, a paralegal for another attorney
representing an abortion patient contacted the
Department of Health asking for information about the
clinic.128
In 2007, an investigator for the medical examiner of
Delaware County spoke with several employees of the
Department of Health after an autopsy of a stillborn

failed to respond to numerous complaints).
124. See id. at 143–44 (noting that one Department of Health employee
reported that no complaints had been filed from 1993–2002, yet that employee
had access to a 1996 complaint regarding a patient who suffered a perforated
uterus).
125. See id. at 144 (detailing a complaint originally filed by a pediatrician
who began noticing that patients returning from Gosnell’s clinic were infected
with a sexually transmitted parasite that they did not have before their
abortions).
126. See id. (noting that the pediatrician never heard back from the
Department of Health regarding his complaint, nor was it included in response
to the Grand Jury’s subpoena requesting all such complaints relating to
Gosnell’s clinic).
127. See id. (explaining that, though the department told the attorney that
there were no inspections of the clinic because there had been no complaints,
complaints against the clinic had been filed between 1993 and 2002).
128. See id. at 145 (mentioning two other complaints received by the
department).
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infant showed that Gosnell had induced delivery in
preparation for aborting a thirty-week-old fetus, in
violation
of
the
twenty-four-week
limit
under
Pennsylvania law.129 Department of Health officials
recommended that the investigator report the matter to a
district attorney.130
In November 2009, Gosnell notified the Department of
Health that another patient, Karnamaya Mongar, had
died following an abortion at his clinic.131

None of these inquiries, reports, and complaints prompted
the Department of Health to visit Gosnell’s clinic.132 The clinic
was not inspected for compliance with Pennsylvania laws and
regulations for a period of over sixteen years, from 1993 to
2010.133 Following the 1993 change in policy, the Department of
Health did not visit Gosnell’s clinic again until they were asked to
join law enforcement personnel investigating allegations that
Gosnell wrote illegal prescriptions for controlled substances.134
The grand jury concluded that the Department of Health’s failure
to enforce Pennsylvania’s abortion laws and regulations went
beyond bad management and appeared to amount to “purposeful
neglect.”135
129. See id. at 146 (noting the Department of Health’s failure to investigate
or file a complaint when a medical examiner reported a thirty week abortion
performed by Gosnell).
130. See id. (explaining that the department referred the medical examiner
to the District Attorney’s office because neither the Department of Health nor
the state medical board had authority over the issue); id. at 84–86 (noting that a
medical examiner reported Gosnell’s abortion of a thirty week fetus to the
Department of Health, but the department “took no action”).
131. See id. at 149 (noting that on November 24, 2009, Gosnell faxed the
Department of Health a letter notifying it that Mongar died following an
abortion, though he incorrectly stated the date of her procedure).
132. See id. at 143 (“The state Department of Health failed to investigate
Gosnell’s clinic even in response to complaints.”).
133. See id. at 142–43 (noting that after the 1993 inspection, sixteen years
passed without further on-site inspection).
134. See id. at 152 (“It was not until February 18, 2010, when DOH
representatives were escorted in by law enforcement agents, that they finally
inspected the clinic that they had not bothered to visit in 13 years.”).
135. See id. at 170 (noting that the Department of Health’s policy of
inspecting abortion clinics only in response to complaints and its failure to
respond to complaints “reflect[s] purposeful neglect” and raises the question
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The Pennsylvania Department of State, which oversees
medical licensing through its Board of Medicine, was another
agency that could have exercised regulatory authority with
respect to Gosnell’s practice.136 Like the Department of Health,
the Board of Medicine received a number of complaints about
Gosnell over the years:
• In December 2001, a former employee of Gosnell’s,
Marcella Stanley Choung, filed a complaint about the
clinic.137 According to the grand jury, she reported that
Gosnell was using unlicensed workers
(including herself) to give IV anesthesia to
patients when he was not at the clinic; that his
facility was filthy; that two sick, flea-infested
cats roamed freely in the procedure rooms,
vomiting throughout; that Gosnell ate in the
procedure rooms; that the autoclave used to
sterilize instruments was broken; that he
reused single-use curettes; that there were no
licensed nurses at the facility when IV
anesthesia was administered; that Gosnell
allowed one patient to use her cousin’s
insurance card to pay for an abortion; that
Gosnell performed abortions on ‘underage
children’ against their will if their mothers
asked him to; and that he performed other
abortions without consent forms.138
A cursory investigation was done of some of Choung’s claims,
though simple steps were not taken, such as visiting the clinic
or interviewing other unlicensed employees, which could have
verified her allegations.139

whether it actually intended to protect the health and safety of women seeking
abortions).
136. See id. at 173 (explaining that the Department of State’s Bureau of
Professional and Occupational Affairs oversees twenty-nine boards, including
the Board of Medicine, which was aware of Gosnell’s illegal practices).
137. See id. at 176–80 (detailing Choung’s complaint and noting the
Department of States’s failure to adequately investigate).
138. Id. at 177.
139. Id. at 177–79.
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In 2002, an insurance company reported that it had paid
$400,000 to settle a claim by the family of Semika Shaw, a
twenty-two-year-old who died following an abortion by
Gosnell.140
In 2005, an attorney sent the Board of Medicine a
malpractice complaint alleging that Gosnell had
administered an anesthetic that should not be given to a
methadone patient like the plaintiff, resulting in a
seizure.141 The Board of Medicine took no action, even
though the attorney pointed out that Gosnell was
uninsured at the time of the incident.142
A different official at the Board of Medicine was handling
a report that Gosnell did not have insurance as required
by law, a violation that could have been verified through
investigation.143 Gosnell in fact performed abortions in
Pennsylvania for ten months without insurance, telling
his insurer that he was only practicing in Delaware at the
time.144
In 2008, the Board of Medicine received a copy of a
malpractice complaint against Gosnell for tearing a
patient’s cervix, uterus, and bowel during an incomplete
abortion that left fetal parts in the patient’s body.145
Gosnell allegedly delayed sending the patient to the
hospital, where she required extensive surgery.146 A

•

•

•

140. See id. at 174 (noting that the Department of State took no action
though it received notification of a $400,000 settlement to the family of Semika
Shaw).
141. See id. at 181–82 (detailing the complaint).
142. See id. at 182–83 (noting that the Department of State closed the case
even though Gosnell failed to satisfy insurance coverage requirements).
143. See id. at 183 (noting that an attorney for the Bureau of Professional
and Occupational Affairs continuously checked with compliance officers to
ascertain whether or not Gosnell was insured, but ultimately closed the file in
2008 without further investigation); id. at 183–84 (explaining that by
conducting a real investigation or subpoenaing documents, attorneys could have
discovered Gosnell’s lack of insurance).
144. See id. at 183–84 (noting that Gosnell did not have insurance between
July 15, 2004, and April 18, 2005, and that during this time he told his
insurance agent that he was only practicing in Delaware).
145. See id. at 184–85 (reciting facts of the complaint).
146. See id. at 184 (noting that Gosnell refused to call an ambulance, forcing
the patient to wait for several hours before she was finally taken to a hospital,
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simple search of a database maintained by the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services could have
disclosed that at least five other women had previously
successfully sued Gosnell for perforating their uteruses,
but the Board’s investigator allegedly did not have access
to the database.147
The grand jury was particularly surprised that Department of
State officials closed the files on both the allegations by former
employee Marcella Choung and the reported death of patient
Semika Shaw on the same day without further action.148
A third agency that failed to take action despite reports of
major problems at Gosnell’s clinic was the Philadelphia
Department of Public Health.149 A city employee visited Gosnell’s
clinic in July 2008 in connection with a vaccine program.150 She
found the clinic being run by “clueless” employees151 and noted
pervasive unsanitary conditions: “[T]he office was not clean at all,
and many areas of the clinic smell like urine.”152 Expired vaccines
were kept in a refrigerator with incomplete temperature logs.153
Chicken pox vaccines were stored in a freezer along with the
where she required surgery).
147. See id. at 185–86 (explaining that the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB) allows state boards of medicine to identify and discipline medical
practitioners engaging in unprofessional behavior and that the NPDB or
Department of State records should have easily revealed Gosnell’s history of
perforating uteruses). See id. at 11 for information on a successful civil suit filed
against Gosnell after a twenty-two-year-old woman died from sepsis when
Gosnell perforated her uterus during an abortion.
148. See id. at 181 (finding it “incomprehensible” that a single Board of
Medicine prosecutor and his supervisor could dispose of the Choung and Shaw
allegations at the same time).
149. See id. at 199–212 (detailing the Philadelphia Department of Public
Health’s failure to respond to various complaints).
150. See id. at 200–01 (detailing the July 2008 vaccine inspection of
Gosnell’s clinic).
151. See id. at 200 (noting that a Department of Public Health employee had
trouble scheduling an appointment at Gosnell’s clinic and that two women
whom she described as “clueless” were present the day of the appointment
rather than Gosnell or the office manager).
152. Id. at 201. The employee noted layers of dust on the baseboards and
murky water in the fish tanks. Id.
153. See id. (noting that expired vaccines were found in the refrigerator with
March 2006 and 2005 expiration dates and the temperature log had not been
completed for nearly one and a half months).
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bloody remains of aborted fetuses.154 The employee returned in
October 2009 and again wrote a report detailing problems at the
clinic, raising the question of why she saw patients in the
procedure area at a time when Gosnell was absent and the only
“doctor” at the clinic did not have a Pennsylvania medical
license.155 Based on the employee’s reports, Gosnell’s clinic was
suspended from the vaccine program, but no further action was
taken.156 City health officials never followed through on plans to
report Gosnell to state licensing authorities.157 The grand jury
also found that at least five of Gosnell’s patients received
emergency room care at nearby hospitals following abortions, but
apparently in only one instance did the hospital satisfy its state
law duty to report complications from abortions.158
154. Id. at 201. Gosnell had previously been reported to the city health
department for problems related to the storage and disposal of fetal remains.
See id. at 204–07 (detailing the city health department’s inspections of Gosnell’s
infectious waste disposal procedures and its failure to enforce the applicable
regulations).
155. See id. at 202 (reporting that a doctor working at Gosnell’s clinic was
not actually licensed in the state of Pennsylvania and falsely claimed to have a
Delaware license); id. at 203 (“Matijkiw concluded her report to her boss: ‘If Dr.
Gosnell was out of the office and [the unlicensed physician] had to call the other
physician’s assistant on his cell phone and leave a message for his MA#, why
were patients in the procedure area?’”).
156. Id. at 201.
157. See id. at 200–03 (noting that after the 2007 and 2009 visits, immediate
action should have been taken by the city health department or the information
should have been passed to other state departments, “yet the city health
department did nothing”).
158. See id. at 213–14 (noting that of the five women who received
emergency medical services at two nearby emergency rooms, the only report
involved a woman who died at the Hospital of the University of Pennsylvania).
Until recently, Maryland was another state that did not inspect abortion clinics.
The state is in the process of implementing inspection procedures. Cf. Erik
Eckholm, Maryland’s Path to an Accord in Abortion Fight, N.Y. TIMES (July 10,
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/us/marylands-path-to-an-accord-inabortion-fight.html?_r=0 (last visited Jan. 11, 2014) (noting that only recently
did Maryland begin the process of implementing inspection procedures) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Andrea K. Walker, Maryland
Suspends Licenses of 3 Abortion Clinics, BALTIMORE SUN (Mar. 12, 2013),
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-12/health/bs-hs-abortion-clinic-suspen
sion-20130308_1_abortion-clinics-clinics-face-surgical-abortion-procedures (last
visited Jan. 11, 2014) (reporting the suspension of three Maryland abortion
clinics nearly eight months after the state began regulating abortion facilities)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Other states have inspected
abortion providers since well before the Gosnell case came to light. See, e.g.,
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V. Measures That Could Help States Protect Viable Fetuses
We have to this point examined three different barriers that,
individually and together, make it difficult for states to protect
the lives of viable fetuses that could survive outside the womb.
First, the Supreme Court’s case law seems to call for some level of
deference to a determination of nonviability by a doctor who
wants to perform an abortion,159 even though that determination
may be erroneous and inconsistent with the conclusions that
would be reached by other physicians.160 Second, abortions near
the viability threshold or beyond typically take place in private
facilities operated by abortion providers, making it difficult to
monitor compliance with a legal prohibition on postviability
abortions.161 Third, in some jurisdictions, public officials may be
unwilling to provide close oversight of abortion clinics.162 Now we
will consider measures that, if permitted by the courts, might
assist a state in vindicating its compelling interest in protecting
the lives of viable fetuses.
The first difficulty arises from using a relatively uncertain
medical determination, like the fact of fetal viability, as a
regulatory line to be enforced by public authorities.163 Bright lines
make law enforcement easier.164 Conversely, law enforcement
Amended Order, Virginia Board of Medicine (May 23, 2006),
http://www.dhp.virginia.gov/Notices/Medicine/0101043653/0101043653Order110
62006.pdf (reporting the results of an unannounced inspection due to in-office
use of anesthesia).
159. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (explaining relevant case law
regarding the Court’s deference to the physician’s determination of viability).
160. See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 396 (1979) (noting that
physicians may disagree about whether second trimester fetuses are viable).
161. See supra Part III (providing details on Gosnell’s clinic, a private
abortion facility that performed late term abortions and avoided regulation for
several years).
162. See supra Part IV (discussing lack of investigation by state and local
authorities in the Gosnell case).
163. See Colautti, 439 U.S. at 395–96 (describing factors which contribute to
the uncertainty of determining fetal viability).
164. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 397
(6th Cir. 2004) (“The music industry, as well as the courts, are best served if
something approximating a bright-line test can be established.”); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459–60 (1981) (“When a person cannot know how a court
will apply a settled principle to a recurring factual situation, that person cannot
know the scope of his constitutional protection, nor can a policeman know the
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efforts are hindered to the extent that the line between legal and
illegal conduct is difficult to discern. A rule that doctors may
perform an abortion on any nonviable fetus, combined with a
requirement of deference to the doctor’s conclusion, will make it
hard to pursue cases near the margin of viability. The problem
may be exacerbated by the due process requirement that guilt in
criminal cases be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.165 The
Supreme Court’s case law virtually guarantees that doctors will
be able to perform abortions on some viable fetuses, even
knowingly, and still avoid successful law enforcement efforts.
Various jurisdictions in recent years have enacted laws
forbidding abortion after twenty weeks.166 Such laws often
measure the twenty week period from fertilization; as a
consequence, they really apply twenty-two weeks after a woman’s
last menstrual period (LMP), a standard way of measuring
gestation.167 Many doctors believe that viability occurs in typical
pregnancies around twenty-four weeks LMP.168 As a consequence,
such laws seek to restrict elective abortions a couple of weeks
before viability might occur in a typical pregnancy.169
The twenty week abortion laws have often been defended
based on contested evidence that the fetus might be capable of
scope of his authority.”).
165. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (stating that guilt in a
criminal case must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt (citing Brinegar v.
United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174 (1949))).
166. See Erik Eckholm, Theory on Pain Is Driving Rules for Abortion, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/us/theory-on-pain-isdriving-rules-for-abortions.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (last visited Jan. 11,
2014) [hereinafter Eckholm, Theory on Pain Is Driving Rules for Abortion]
(reporting various proposed bans on abortions at twenty weeks on the theory
that fetuses can feel pain at that gestational age) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
167. See Julie Rovner, State Laws Limiting Abortion May Face Challenges
on 20-Week Limit, NPR (July 22, 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2013/
07/19/203729609/state-laws-limiting-abortion-may-face-challenges-on-20-weeklimit (last visited Jan. 11, 2014) (explaining that fertilization usually occurs
about two weeks after the woman’s last menstrual period) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. See id. (noting that there is a “consensus that viability doesn’t happen
before 24 weeks”).
169. See generally id. (explaining that “when we’re talking about banning
abortion at 20 or 22 weeks even, that’s clearly at least two weeks before the
earliest point in pregnancy where viability would be a concern”).
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feeling pain at that stage of pregnancy.170 However, an
alternative ground for sustaining such laws would be the
compelling state interest in protecting viable fetuses. The twentyweek line (or twenty-two weeks LMP) would be easier to
ascertain and subject to fewer disagreements among medical
professionals than a regulatory line based on fetal viability.171 As
a consequence, it would be an easier line for the state to enforce.
Such a twenty-week limit on elective abortions would give the
state a modest margin of error and help guard against the risk
that viable fetuses will be aborted based on erroneous (or
fraudulent) determinations that they are not viable.
States are also hindered in protecting viable fetuses because
abortions are typically performed in private abortion facilities,
making it possible for doctors who perform postviability abortions
to conceal their conduct.172 Though the problem might be
addressed through close oversight of abortion clinics, public
officials in some states have proved unwilling to monitor clinics to
ensure compliance with the law.173 These problems could be
partially addressed through adoption of hospitalization
requirements.
While the Supreme Court has declined to permit a
hospitalization requirement for all second-trimester abortions,174
there is strong evidence that risks from second-trimester
abortions increase significantly with each additional week of
170. See Eckholm, Theory on Pain Is Driving Rules for Abortion, supra note
166 (reporting proposed bans on abortions at twenty weeks, many of which are
based on the theory that a fetus can feel pain at that stage in development).
171. The Colautti Court noted that gestational age is one of several
uncertain factors that play into medical decisions about fetal viability. Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395–96 (1979). It is virtually axiomatic that there will
be more grounds for disagreement over application of a multi-factor analysis
than there will be over one of the factors considered in isolation.
172. See, e.g., GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 67, at 247 (noting a lack of
sufficient evidence because many of Gosnell’s illicit activities were performed
inside his private clinic).
173. See, e.g., id. at 137–215 (describing the lack of state and local
supervision of Gosnell’s private abortion clinic in Pennsylvania).
174. See, e.g., City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 452 (1983) (invalidating city ordinance requiring physicians to perform all
second trimester abortions at accredited hospitals); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of
Kan. City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 481–82 (1983) (striking a requirement that
second semester abortions be performed in hospitals).
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pregnancy.175 Even Planned Parenthood is willing to acknowledge
that “[a]fter 20 weeks, the risk of death from childbirth and
abortion are about the same,”176 but there is good reason to
believe that carrying a pregnancy to term is in fact safer than
abortion at advanced stages of pregnancy. The Guttmacher
Institute acknowledges that abortion risks increase the later in
pregnancy the abortion is performed.177 The study cited by the
Guttmacher Institute found that risks from abortion increase
exponentially as pregnancy progresses:
Compared with women whose abortions were performed at or
before 8 weeks of gestation, women whose abortions were
performed in the second trimester were significantly more
likely to die of abortion-related causes. The relative risk
(unadjusted) of abortion-related mortality was 14.7 at 13–15

175. See ABORTION AFTER THE FIRST TRIMESTER, supra note 66, at 3 (noting
that the rate of complication increases for each week of gestation after eight
weeks).
PARENTHOOD,
176. See
In-Clinic
Abortion
Procedures,
PLANNED
http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/abortion/in-clinic-abortion-pro
cedures-4359.asp (last visited Aug. 10, 2013) (comparing the risk of abortion and
childbirth) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). A consent form
used at one clinic performing late term abortions informs patients that “[t]he
risk of terminating a pregnancy gradually increases throughout the course of
pregnancy. These comparative risks become approximately equal at 16–18
weeks of pregnancy and increase so that pregnancy termination at 18 weeks and
above involves a greater risk than carrying the pregnancy to term.” Informed
Consent for Pregnancy Termination Treatment, Anesthetic, and Other Medical
Services, Southwestern Women’s Options, PROTECT ABQ WOMEN & CHILDREN,
http://www.protectabqwomenandchildren.com/southwestern-womens-optionsconsent-form.html (last visited November 23, 2013) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); Betsy Woodruff, Albuquerque Votes on Late-Term
Abortion Ban, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Nov. 18, 2013), http://www.national
review.com/article/364170/albuquerque-votes-late-term-abortion-ban-betsy-wood
ruff (last visited Jan. 11, 2014) (“[T]he form clearly states that having an
abortion after 18 weeks is more dangerous than carrying the pregnancy to
term.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
177. See Facts on Induced Abortion in the United States, GUTTMACHER INST.
(Feb. 2014), http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/fb_induced_abortion.html (last
visited Jan. 13, 2014) (“The risk of death associated with abortion increases with
the length of pregnancy, from one death for every one million abortions at or
before eight weeks to one per 29,000 at 16–20 weeks—and one per 11,000 at 21
weeks or later.” (citation omitted)) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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weeks of gestation, 29.5 at 16–20 weeks, and 76.6 at or after
21 weeks.178

The researchers found a mortality rate of 8.9 deaths per 100,000
abortions at 21 weeks and above.179 By way of comparison, the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention reports that, as of
1997, overall maternal mortality from carrying a pregnancy to
term was 7.7 deaths per 100,000 live births.180 The researchers
cited by the Guttmacher Institute developed a model from their
data showing “a 38% increase in risk of death for each additional
week of gestation.”181
In addition to the safety advantages of a hospitalization
requirement partway through the second trimester, performance
of late-term abortions in a hospital would make it more difficult
to violate a law restricting elective, postviability abortions. With
such a hospitalization requirement in place, abortions near the
viability threshold would be performed in a mainstream medical
facility, rather than a facility dedicated to performance of
abortions. This would help promote the accuracy and availability
of medical records relevant to issues of compliance with state
law.182 It would also ensure the presence of medical personnel
with fewer incentives to violate the law or cover up violations by
others.
VI. Conclusion
When it comes to abortion, there are many points on which
Americans disagree. One point of widespread agreement,
however, is that states should be able to restrict access to
abortion of viable fetuses capable of living independent of the
178. Bartlett et al., supra note 67, at 729. The author has omitted certain
95% confidence interval data from this source to enhance readability.
179. Id. at 733.
180. Achievements in Public Health, 1900–1999: Healthier Mothers and
Babies, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 1, 1999),
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm 4838a2.htm (last visited Jan.
11, 2014) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
181. Bartlett et al., supra note 67, at 731.
182. See GRAND JURY REPORT, supra note 68, at 247 (believing that Gosnell
avoided many criminal charges because the illicit activities were isolated within
his clinic and therefore it became difficult to secure ample evidence).
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mother.183 An examination of Supreme Court case law184 and
review of the Gosnell case show that even this relatively modest
goal can be quite difficult for a state to attain.185 It would be
appropriate for the Supreme Court to help states vindicate their
compelling interest in protecting viable fetuses by permitting a
reasonable margin for enforcement prior to the uncertain
viability threshold and by allowing a requirement of
hospitalization as that threshold approaches.

183. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)
(reaffirming Roe’s holding that states may regulate abortions of viable fetuses);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1973) (concluding that the state’s interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling at viability).
184. See supra Part II for more discussion of relevant case law.
185. See supra Part III for more on the Gosnell case.

